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Based on contingent claims theory, this paper develops a method to monitor 
systemic risk in the European banking system. Aggregated Distance-to-Default 
series are generated using option prices information from systemically important 
banks and the DJ STOXX Banks Index. These indicators provide methodologi-
cal advantages in monitoring vulnerabilities in the banking system over time: 1) 
they capture interdependences and joint risk of distress in systemically important 
banks; 2) their forward-looking feature endow them with early signaling proper-
ties compared to traditional approaches in the literature and other market-based 
indicators; and 3) they produce simultaneously both smooth and informative 
long-term signals and quick and clear reaction to market distress.
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One of the remarkable lessons from the nancial crisis generated in the US subprime mort-
gage market is the need to enhance and extend the systemic risk's analytic toolbox to guide
policymaking. The interest in systemic risk analysis is not that new1 and was driven by
last decade's nancial innovation, liberalization and development. However, the dynamics
of this nancial crisis has triggered renewed attention and operational focus.
The theoretical and empirical details of dening and assessing systemic risk in bank-
ing are still in progress. Accordingly, dierent approaches have emerged in the literature
and are either replacing or supplementing existing methodologies that failed to capture
vulnerabilities prior to this crisis. Many of these approaches are moving towards sophisti-
cated portfolio models of risk, where the banking system is considered as a whole. These
models also aim to capture joint risks and interdependences with the use of market-based
information. Recent contributions along these lines are Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009)
and Huang et al. (2009, 2010).
This paper aims to contribute to the literature with a method to monitor systemic
risk in the European banking system based on contingent claims theory. Without strong
modelling assumptions, this paper generates two series of aggregated Distance-to-Default
indicators based on data from balance sheets, equity markets and option markets. The
rst series is a simple average of individual forward-looking Distance-to-Default, computed
using individual equity options. This indicator is standard in the literature and informs
about the overall risk outlook in the system. The second series is a portfolio or system
Distance-to-Default that aggregates balance sheet information into a single entity and uses
the option prices information of the DJ STOXX Banks Index. This indicator supplements
the information of the average Distance-to-Default, outlining the joint risk of distress and
embedding interrelations between the banks in the system.
The use of index-based option information also incorporates two innovations in the
1See for instance European Central Bank (2007b) for an interesting overview of the research approach
in the area conducted by the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve.
2literature. First, it makes use of information from an additional liquid market, the equity
index options market. Second, the construction of the indicator avoids arbitrary mod-
elling assumptions or correlation structures among banks in the sample which tend to
weaken its information quality. In other words, the information potential of equity index
options allow the Distance-to-Default indicators to become a forward-looking analytic tool
to monitor systemic risk and interdependences between the banks in the nancial system
over time.
The series generated in the paper are smooth, and allow one to tracking the build-up
of risks in the system with a long-term perspective. They are computable on a daily basis
and incorporate up-to-date market sentiment from option prices. In doing so, they react
quickly to specic market events, when volatility of the components of the system increases
and correlations tend to reveal increased interdependences. The option prices information
also enhances signicantly the forward-looking properties of the series and makes their
signals timelier than in either literature of market-based indicators or alternative speci-
cations similar to mine in employing comparisons between a portfolio and an average of
its components.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 rst reviews the contingent
claims analysis' main features and applications -the supporting theory of this approach-
then makes reference to a specic application of the literature that is a standard tool
of systemic risk analysis. In Section 3, the paper provides a detailed description of the
method which produces individual and aggregated series of forward-looking Distance-to-
Default (DD) indicators using the information of the European banking system and its
core systemic components. Section 4 reports the main results of the DD series, highlight-
ing its main attributes as a systemic risk indicator and its advantages when compared to
possible alternative specications in the related literature. Section 5 concludes.
32 Theoretical Underpinnings
2.1 Contingent Claims Analysis
Contingent Claims Analysis (CCA) is a framework that combines market-based and bal-
ance sheet information to obtain a comprehensive set of company nancial risk indicators,
e.g: distance-to-default, probabilities of default, risk-neutral credit risk premia, expected
losses on senior debt, etc. Based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model of option pricing,
CCA has three principles: 1) the economic value of liabilities2 is derived and equals the
economic value of assets; 2) liabilities in the balance sheet have dierent priorities (and
thus risk); and 3) the company assets distribution follows a stochastic process (Echeverr a
et al., 2006).
In this context, as liabilities are viewed as contingent claims against assets with payos
determined by seniority, equity becomes a call option on the market value of assets with
strike price dened by the default or distress barrier (determined by the risky debt). As
company assets decline and move closer to the default barrier, the market value of the call
option also falls. The distance between market value of asset and the distress barrier is
called Distance-to-Default (DD) and constitutes the nancial risk indicator used in this
paper to assess systemic risk in Europe's banking sector3. Distance-to-Default indicates
the number of standard deviations at which the market value of assets is away from the
default barrier and can be scaled into probabilities of default, if the distribution of assets
were known. Details of its derivation and data requirements can be found in Appendix A.
This method has initially been applied to company default risk analysis and dissemi-
nated by Moody's KMV -see for instance Arora et al. (2005); Crosbie and Bohn (2003);
Arora and Sellers (2004) - proving very eective in prediction of ratings' downgrading and
company default. More recently, the CCA approach has been extended to both individual
and aggregate nancial and non-nancial sectors and also to sovereign macronancial risk.
Gray and Malone (2008) provide a comprehensive review of methodologies and related lit-
2Deposits and senior debt plus equity in the case of banks.
3This paper is limited to the development of Distance-to-Default series and their application. The use
of the rest of risk indicators derived from this methodology remains for further research.
4erature.
DD series and other CCA-derived risk measures are forward-looking, easy and data-
ecient to compute at high-frequencies. They are also good indicators of market sentiment,
relatively less aected by government interventions and they incorporate most relevant el-
ements of credit risk. Results in Gropp et al. (2004); International Monetary Fund (2009)
and Tudela and Young (2003), inter alia, show also that DD improves and even outper-
forms other indicators of nancial stability including bond or CDS spreads.
However, as the Financial Stability Board (2009b) and the International Monetary
Fund (2009) point out, CCA measures also have some shortcomings, common to most
market-based nancial stability indicators and originated in the input data quality. In
particular, they are sensitive to market liquidity and market volatility and also dependant
on the accuracy of the market assessment, meaning that it may be possible that in periods
of high stress in nancial markets, they could not be obtained and even if they could, their
signals are unclear. Even if stress signals from DD series were available, the indicator
could at best be coincident with market events, leaving little margin for policy makers to
react (Borio and Drehmann, 2009).4
2.2 Aggregation Methods of Individual Distance-to-Default Series
Despite its shortcomings, the CCA approach has been recommended by the Financial Sta-
bility Board (2009a) to enhance systemic risk analysis as a tool to identify systemically
important nancial institutions. The potential to use aggregated DD series to also monitor
systemic risk is not negligible and, in the case of the European and other mature banking
4Additional methodological drawbacks not tackled in this paper include the assumption of an ad-hoc
default barrier, constant interest rates and constant volatility. Capuano (2008) tackles the rst issue
proposing an endogenously determined default barrier that rapidly incorporates market sentiment about
the developments of the balance sheets, while Chan-Lau and Sy (2006) introduce modications in the ad-hoc
default barrier to capture pre-default regulatory actions, such as Prompt-Corrective-Actions frameworks,
a common feature in the case of nancial institutions. Findings in Echeverr a et al. (2009) show that the
choice of risk-free interest rates does not aect the estimates of DD signicantly but their selection has to
be adjusted to the specicities of the institutions and markets of analysis (see Blavy and Souto (2009) for
a detailed discussion in the case of the Mexican banking system). Finally, as for constant volatility, this
assumption is relaxed in some models that introduce time varying -generally GARCH(1,1)- volatility series.
Research in Echeverr a et al. (2006) and Gray and Walsh (2008) are good examples of this approach.
5systems, this potential could even overcome some of the weaknesses cited lines above.
Aggregation of DD is conducted mainly through averages of individual DD and some-
times also calibration of individual data into portfolios of banks, which means treating the
system as one large bank (see Appendix B for details). These approaches are not new in
the literature and the ECB's Financial Stability Review publishes since 2004 series DD
medians and 10th percentiles of global and euro area Large and Complex Banking Groups
(LCBG)5 . The Central Bank of Chile introduced the methodology applied to the Chilean
banking system in 2006 (Echeverr a et al., 2006) and the IMF used both average and
portfolio DD series in country reports for the euro area and the United States ( De Nicol o
et al. (2005);  Cih ak and Koeva Brooks (2009) and M uhleisen et al. (2006)).
The analysis of DD averages (sometimes also medians or other quantiles) is the stan-
dard practice in the nancial stability publications. Simple averages of individual DD are
highly informative of the dynamics of system-wide risks but can be misleading if analyzed
alone since they do not take into account bank size dierences and risk interdependences.
While weighted averages or quantile DD partially solve the bank size problem, they do not
tackle the interdependences among banks and therefore fail to react to swings in periods of
nancial stress ( Cih ak, 2007; Chan-Lau and Gravelle, 2005). On the other hand, portfolio
DD tracks the evolution of the lower bound to the joint probabilities of distress (De Nicol o
and Tieman, 2007) and enhances therefore information quality of average DD series, since
it takes into account bank size and risk interdependence among banks6. The relationship
between average and portfolio DD conveys therefore a comprehensive set of instruments
to track systemic risk. This joint dynamics works as follows, when the returns correlation
increases in times of market distress, showing higher interdependences, both series tend to
drop and the gap between them tends to narrow. Since portfolio DD is in general higher
than average DD and therefore is a lower bound of distress, the joint movement of DD
series contains relevant information about increasing systemic risk.
5See European Central Bank (2005) for the introduction of the indicator in the publication series.
6This holds true in spite of the fact that aggregation of individual balance sheet data does not fully take
into consideration the crossed exposures, i.e. the portfolio balance sheet data are similar to unconsolidated
bank gures
6The construction of portfolio DD involves an additional assumption, portfolio equity
returns volatility require pairwise covariances. If the portfolio DD is built on the base of
historical price returns, this does not pose a problem. If individual GARCH-modelled or
option implied volatilities are used as inputs, covariances are either neglected or historical
or intra-day pairwise covariances are used7. In either case, the indicator becomes a coin-
cident one and may fail to detect early signals of market stress (International Monetary
Fund , 2009).
The information potential of aggregated DD series has not been fully exploited, given
the rich data available in mature markets where option markets are active and deep. In-
deed, standard implied volatilities of options on individual bank stocks are used only to a
limited extent, and implied volatilities from options on sector-based indices are missing in
the literature. The inclusion of individual and index implied volatilities can enhance the
information content of average and portfolio DD series without imposing strong method-
ological assumptions. Sections 3 and 4 show how this methodology can be applied and
how it compares to existing use of DD to monitor systemic risk.
3 Empirical Application
The empirical approach in this paper consists of two steps. First, individual forward-
looking DD series are computed for all banks in sample. These series are then averaged8
and compared to an also forward-looking portfolio DD. The second series is built from the
implied volatilities extracted from the options on the DJ STOXX Banks Index.
Both series are smooth by construction and forward-looking, given the properties of
implied volatilities (Whaley, 2009), and the dierence between the two series shows pri-
marily joint risk of distress in the banking system. The two series share a similar long
7Most literature use historical covariance series and Huang et al. (2009, 2010) propose an innovation
using high-frequency intra-day covariances to add a forward-looking dimension to asset return correlation.
8This paper reports results using only a simple average. Weighted averages (using individual market
capitalization) have been tried without aecting results.
7term trend, showing the overall risk prole of the system. In addition, they also react in a
clear and timely manner to short-lived events of high market volatility without generating
excess noise in the series or aecting the longer term trend.
3.1 The Sample
The portfolio of banks includes the largest 24 European listed institutions, 22 of them
headquartered in the European Union and two in Switzerland. The selection reference is
the Forbes Global 2000 ranking from April 20099. All banks in the sample have also been
constituents of the DJ STOXX Banks Index10 over the whole time span of this analysis
and their shares and options are publicly traded in liquid organized exchanges (see Table
1 for details).
[Insert Table 1 here]
In order to justify its systemic importance to represent the whole European banking
system, this portfolio choice complies with several of the size, lack of substitutability and
interconnectedness criteria listed in a recent report published by request of the G-20 Lead-
ers in April 2009 (Financial Stability Board, 2009b). The sample also includes non-EU
banks because of the pan-European dimension of nancial integration.
The bank portfolio accounts for more than 85% of total market value of banks listed
in the reference index over the entire time span of this paper; all banks weigh signicantly
in their respective domestic stock markets in terms of market value and trading volumes,
and most banks have multiple listings at major world exchanges. Their aggregated total
assets add up to more than 60% of the entire EU-27 banking sector at end-2008 and the
composition of assets and liabilities and importance of o-balance sheet activities shows a
9The ranking uses an equally weighted combination of rankings by sales, prots, assets and market
capitalization to assign positions. The composition in the top 25 for Europe has remained stable in the
last decade, taking into account major M&A transactions.
10ING Group belongs to the DJ STOXX Insurance Index due to its bancassurance business model. This
institution is however considered as a bank in the Forbes Global 2000 ranking and in most empirical papers
on nancial stability at EU level. Hypo Real Estate was originally in the sample but then removed due to
data quality reasons. The sample was not enlarged in order to keep high quality data of individual implied
volatilities.
8highly diversied range of businesses.
In addition to the relevant market shares in domestic markets, these banks also op-
erate at a large cross-border scale throughout Europe. On average, around 30% of their
total revenues was generated in a European country other than the home market and over
25% of total revenues was generated outside Europe in 2008 (Posen and V eron, 2009).
Finally, the portfolio of banks constitutes the core of the ECB's LCBG11, which means
that these banks are not only big and engaged in complex businesses, but also are highly
interconnected to each other and to the rest of the nancial system, making supervisory
oversight more dicult.
In order to estimate individual DD series, both balance sheet and market data are
needed between 30 September 2002 and 31 July 2009 (1785 trading days). Balance sheet
data comprise annual and interim data on total assets, short-term liabilities and equity.
The market-based data include daily observations of risk-free interest rates, market capital-
ization, euro exchange rates and at-the-money implied volatilities12. The risk-free interest
rates are 10-year government bond yields in each bank's country of origin. See Table 2 for
a description of data and sources.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The calculation of the portfolio DD series requires also daily put and call implied
volatilities of options on the DJ STOXX Banks Index under the premise that timely and
meaningful implied volatilities call for prices from an active index option market (Whaley,
2009). These series start at the end of the third quarter 2002, which determines the sample
start of this paper. The end date is set on 31 July 2009 in order to include second quarter
interim reports' information for all banks. The time span therefore includes tranquil times
in the beginning, periods of minor stress since 2006, the nancial crisis since August 2007
11In addition, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Barclays, HSBC, Soci et e G en erale, UBS, RBS and BNP
Paribas were initially included by the Bank of England in the list of Large Complex Financial Institutions
(LCFI) due to their important role in the global nancial system.
12Missing values for Cr edit Agricole prior to November 25th 2005 and for Natixis for the whole sample
have been replaced for GARCH(1,1) volatility estimates. Infrequent missing values have been replaced for
those from the previous trading day.
9and the recent markets' recovery and sector restructuring since March 2009.
3.2 Calibration of Average and Portfolio Distance-to-Default Series.
Appendices A and B contain a detailed methodological explanation of the procedure fol-
lowed in this paper to compute both average and portfolio DD series, according to the
literature. This section only discusses certain particularities in the data and approach in
this paper.
Individual DD series have daily frequency. In practical terms, this means the balance
sheet information has to be modied from its original quarterly, half-yearly or yearly fre-
quencies. In this paper, the data were interpolated into daily series using cubic splines. In
the second step, daily default barriers are computed using these new series of liabilities.
The last step before computing the daily average DD series is to convert put and call im-
plied volatilities into an average implied volatility and then calibrate the individual DD.












where DD is the simple average of N individual DDi t periods ahead. For each bank i,
Ai is the implied value of assets; Ei is the market value of equity; 
Ai
i is the implied asset
volatility; 
IVi
i is equity price return volatility obtained from individual equity options; Di
is the distress barrier, ri is risk-free interest rate in the respective home market.
Portfolio DD requires aggregation of the balance sheet data. Since they are denom-
inated in dierent currencies, these gures are converted into euro before interpolation
using ocial bilateral exchange rates. The euro-denominated balance sheet data and daily
market values (converted on a daily basis into euros) are aggregated into single series for
the whole portofolio. Risk-free interest rates are aggregated using market value as weight-
ing factor.
10Finally, implied volatilities of put and call options on the DJ STOXX Banks Index
are also transformed into daily averages. Using index implied volatilities means in prac-
tice that this paper does not only add a forward looking component to the portfolio DD,
comparable to average DD, but also that no covariance structure is assumed. It is taken
directly from market data, re
ecting market perceptions of joint distress risk in the con-
stituents of the reference index, the European banking system. The expression for the







where DDP is the portfolio's DD t periods ahead. For a given portfolio P composed of N
banks, AP is the implied value of assets; EP is the equity market value of the portfolio; P
is the implied asset volatility; 
IVIndex
P is the portfolio's equity volatility obtained from the
index options; DP is the portfolio's distress barrier, rP is the weighted average of risk-free
interest rates in the N banks' markets.
4 Results
The main results focus on the series of average and portfolio DD series and their dierence
as a tool to monitor systemic risk in Europe's banking system, namely: 1) they focus on
the system as a whole and look at interdependences between banks; 2) they are smooth
by construction, avoiding low signal-to-noise ratios and fuzzy signals, which allows one
to track systemic risk over time; 3) they contain forward-looking signals of distress; and
4) they show quick but short-lived coincident reactions to market events, in other words,
their informative properties are not signicantly aected by their ability to promptly de-
tect shocks in the markets.
114.1 Aggregated Distance-to-Default Series
Figure 1 and Figure 2 plot together the forward-looking average and portfolio DD series,
their dierence and also the DJ STOXX Banks Index as a reference13. As expected,
portfolio DD moves along and exceeds average DD over the entire sample and both series
provide a good picture of past market assessment and future outlook of the banking system
in Europe.
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Figures 3 and 4 plot together the DD series calculated using only put implied volatili-
ties, since put options are more reactive to market specic events and contain important
information regarding the demands for portfolio insurance and market volatility (Whaley,
2009). As DD series obtained using average implied volatilities are smoother, a valued
property of market-based indicators in the analysis of systemic risk, the results of this
paper focus on them only, although it is desirable that the analysis of short term market
distress takes into account the information potential of put-derived DD series14.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 here]
Distance between average and portfolio DD series tends to narrow when the two indica-
tors are going down (Gray and Malone, 2008). This characteristic is a result of increasing
correlation of underlying stocks' returns in times of distress and it holds true for these se-
ries as well after February 2007, when the subprime crisis started to unfold, and especially
after the start of the credit crunch in August 2007, when the European banking system
was no longer perceived as \sound".
In addition, due to dierent sources of implied volatilities, the dierence also narrows
for a limited time during episodes of short-lived market distress while the banking system
still is in healthy shape and also widens during distressed times in response to positive
news. An example of the rst case is the credit rating downgrade of General Motors
13Figure 2 shows the series since 2005 to account for the generalized adoption of IFRS accounting
standards that might have introduced a break in the series due to revaluation of balance sheet items, see
European Central Bank (2006) and Rapp and Qu (2007) for further discussion.
14Put options are extensively used for insurance purposes, i.e. hedgers buy puts if they have concerns
about a potential drop in the markets (Whaley, 2009).
12and Ford in May 2005, when their dierence abruptly tightened even though average and
portfolio DD were still at high levels. A second example is the market turbulence in
May-June 2006, where global equity markets are hit by a rise in investors' risk aversion.
A nal example pre-crisis is February 2007, when fears about Asian equity markets and
deterioration in the US subprime mortgages hit equity markets. In all cases, the eect
would not be perceived if only average DD series were portrayed (see ECB's DD series
in Figures 5 and 6). Symmetrically, positive news is also perceived in the series through
transitory widening of DD series gap during bad times, as in the late 2008, when capital
injections, consolidation and emergency actions were taking place at an unprecedented
scale to ensure solvency in the sector.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 here]
Another interesting feature of the reported DD series is the fact that they reach their
peak in 2005, long before our equity markets' benchmark reached theirs (DJ STOXX
Banks Index) and long before the DD series computed using historical equity information
(ECB's DD series). In addition, they start a downward trend around this date -as noted
more clearly in the gap and its 60-day moving average- that only bounces back after the
rst quarter of 2009. This forward-looking feature provides additional support to the abil-
ity in DD of early systemic risk monitoring.
As noted in previous sections, most market-based indicators of nancial stability are
targets of criticism after the crisis because of their poor performance during the recent
crisis and their failure to detect early signals of distress in major banking institutions.
Indeed, the ECB's Financial Stability Review reports the decline of DD series only in the
second quarter 2007 and equity markets remained somewhat stable even after the liquid-
ity squeeze took place (European Central Bank, 2007a). Even if the forward-looking DD
series presented in this section had no predictive power, the gures described above make
a strong argument for the combined use of forward-looking DD series based on option
prices information to monitor the general build-up of risk in systemically important banks
in Europe.
134.2 Properties of the Indicator of Stress
The smoothness and forward-looking features of my DD series are quite evident in Figures
7 and 8, where I also plot DD series that use volatilities generated by GARCH models.
These series are signicantly more volatile than the benchmark, even if additional simi-
lar assumptions were made for their estimation15. GARCH-derived volatilities have the
advantage of quick adjustment to changes in the underlying data, but they also tend to
overshoot afterwards. This feature means more noise in the DD indicator, which leads
in practice to a dicult interpretation of its signals and more frequent false positives in
the series of DD dierences. As a result, reliability of this approach is reduced in terms
of monitoring systemic risk compared to both the benchmark series and even DD series
constructed with historical volatilities. In addition, the trends in the GARCH-derived DD
series are not as clear as those depicted in Figures 1 and 2 and there is more dominance
of the short-lived market events.
[Insert Figures 7 and 8 here]
Finally, the forward-looking property of average and portfolio DD series derived from
option implied volatilities was econometrically examined running pairwise Granger causal-
ity tests vis- a-vis the monthly DD series reported by the ECB in the Financial Stability
Review series16. Results are reported in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Results of Granger tests provide econometric support to the forward-looking feature
of our series. Table 3 shows that forward-looking DD indicators Granger cause ECB's
median DD series up to two years, as Figures 5 and 6 suggested. More robust results are
obtained for longer lags in the test using average DD because of 1) the similar method used
15GARCH(1,1) volatilities were estimated using prices of individual banks' shares and DJ STOXX Banks
Index since 31/12/1998, adding an observation as daily closing prices become available in order to generate
more realistic data series. The DD series followed the same estimation methodology described in Section
3. In terms of the portfolio DD, this means that GARCH volatilities are estimated for the index and
covariances are neglected. Although not reported, Granger causality tests were conducted for average,
portfolio and dierences series, showing rejection of the null hypothesis that main DD do not cause GARCH-
generated DD for 5, 10 and 20 day lags, especially for the average DD.
16Average and portfolio DD were previously transformed to match monthly frequency of ECB data and
unit root and cointegration tests were conducted prior to the Granger causality tests.
14to obtain these series; and 2) the eect of transitory volatility shocks in the portfolio DD
indicator is partially cancelled out in averages and median DD series. In spite of this, these
results strongly suggest that -even with the ability of a GARCH model to react quickly
to changes in volatility- there is still a backward-looking component embedded that is
not present in the DD series that incorporate option price information. The DD series
constructed in this paper have therefore an important advantage as a tool of systemic risk
analysis.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper proposes a method to monitor systemic risk in the European banking sys-
tem. The approach relies on contingent claims theory to generate aggregated Distance-to-
Default series using option prices information from systemically important banks and the
DJ STOXX Banks Index. The analysis extends from 30 September 2002 to 31 July 2009,
covering both calm times and the current nancial crisis.
The portfolio of banks comprises the largest nancial institutions in Europe, character-
ized by a high degree of complexity and close linkages to the rest of the nancial system.
This approach is applicable to mature economies, where option markets are active and
liquid in both individual equity and equity index option contracts.
The generated series revealed several methodological advantages with respect to tradi-
tional approaches in the literature and other market-based indicators of nancial stability.
Firstly, the analysis of systemic risk is notably enhanced if both average and portfolio
Distance-to-Default series and their gap are used to monitor vulnerability in the banking
system over time. The aggregated series encompass the analysis of both overall and joint
risk of distress in the system.
Secondly, results in the paper show that the information embedded in option prices
endow the series with a forward-looking property, allowing for early signaling of distress,
15which is not perceived by many other market based indicators of nancial stability or even
by backward-looking specications of similar indicators. The use of implied volatilities
from options on the sector index also helps circumvent assumptions about equity prices
correlations and the use of historical data, which would turn the indicator into a coinci-
dent one. It also helps avoid arbitrary assumptions in the model to capture interdepences
between banks during times of distress.
Finally, the aggregated Distance-to-Default series are smooth and show quick and clear
reaction to short-lived market events without weakening their longer-term informational
content. In other words, they incorporate very quickly market expectations via option
prices that do not distort the overall risk outlook in the nancial system.The research of
this paper was conducted while the author was visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Cleveland. He thanks helpful comments from its Research Department and especially
Ben Craig for his support and encouragement. All remaining errors and views presented
here are solely those of the author.
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20Appendix A. Derivation of Distance-to-Default
Given the three principles in CCA mentioned in Section 2.1, company value (represented
by its assets, A) is the sum of its risky debt (D) and equity (E). Since equity is a junior
claim to debt, the former can be expressed as a standard call option on the assets with
strike price equal to the value of risky debt (also known in the literature as distress barrier
or default barrier).
maxf0;A   Dg (A.1)
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian Motion, the
application of the standard Black-Sholes option pricing formula yields the closed-form

















where r is the rate of growth of the company value (assets) and equals the risk-free interest
rate. A is asset volatility.
In practice, implied asset value A and volatility A are not observable and must be esti-







where E is the value of equity, E is the equity price return volatility. N() is the









t , d2 = d1   A
p
t
The calculation of DD in the literature uses market value as the value of equity E; his-
torical, GARCH-derived or option-implied volatilities as equity price return volatility E;
government bond yields as the risk-free interest rate r and the face value of short-term lia-
bilities plus half of that of long-term liabilities as the default barrier D. The time horizon
t is usually set at one year.
21Appendix B. Derivation of Portfolio Distance-to-Default
Aggregation of individual market-based and balance sheet data from N banks into a port-





















i=1 Ai , is the total value of the portfolio's assets (unobservable).
DP =
PN
i=1 Di , is the total value of the portfolio's risky debt.
EP =
PN
i=1 Ei , is the equity market value of the portfolio.
rP =
PN
i=1 wiri , is the weighted average of risk-free rates.
wi = Ei
EP , or alternatively wi = Ai






j=1 wiwjij , is the portfolio's asset variance (unobservable), where ij is
the asset return covariance of bank i and j.
After aggregating individual data and assuming the volatility structure of the portfolio,
calibration is conducted solving the system of equations from Appendix A. See De Nicol o
et al. (2005), De Nicol o and Tieman (2007), Echeverr a et al. (2006), Echeverr a et al.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23Table 2: Description of Variables
Balance Sheet Variables
Variable Denition
Total Assets As reported in Annual and Interim Reports. Source. Bankscope, code
2025.
Short-term Liabilities Deposits and Short term funding. Source. Bankscope, code 2030.




Risk-free Interest Rate Benchmark ten-year bond yield of country where the bank in question
is headquartered. Source. Thomson Datastream.
Market Capitalization Total market value measured by close share price multiplied by the or-
dinary number of shares in individual issue. Expressed in thousands of
domestic currency (converted into euro at ocial ECB exchange rates).
Source. Thomson Datastream.
Exchange Rates End-of-day bilateral exchange rates against the euro. Source. European
Central Bank.
Equity Implied Volatilities Daily at-the-money implied volatilities of call and put options on indi-
vidual bank shares (American style), traded at NYSE Euronext, Eurex
and Nasdaq OMX. Source. Bloomberg, codes HIST CALL IMP VOL
for calls and HIST PUT IMP VOL for puts.
Index Implied Volatilities Daily at-the-money implied volatilities of call and put options on the DJ
STOXX Banks Index (European style), traded at Eurex. Source. Thom-
son Datastream, codes DJ6BC.SERIESC for calls and DJ6BC.SERIESP
for puts.
Table 3: Granger Causality Tests
Lag DD does not DDECB does not DD
P does not DDECB does not
Granger Cause DDECB Granger Cause DD Granger Cause DDECB Granger Cause DD
P
1 13.5423 2.4077 12.5345 0.9557
0.0004 0.1248 0.0007 0.3313
3 3.3270 1.8711 3.0514 1.1649
0.0244 0.1423 0.0340 0.3293
6 2.0159 1.5253 0.8912 2.9627
0.0769 0.1848 0.5070 0.0131
12 2.6637 1.5157 1.4473 1.8289
0.0089 0.1549 0.1815 0.0727
24 3.9901 1.1544 1.4198 2.1132
0.0242 0.4427 0.3151 0.1371
Table reports F-statistics with p-values below. End-of-month data for Average DD (DD) and Portfolio
DD (DD
P) series. ECB series are monthly median DD computed for a sample of LCBG. Sample used for
test: 30-Sep-2002 to 31-May-2009 due to ECB series data availability.





















































































Difference (left) Portfolio DD (left) Average DD (left) DJ Stoxx Banks Index (right)
Source. Author's calculations and Thomson Datastream

































































Difference (left) Portfolio DD (left) Average DD (left) DJ Stoxx Banks Index (right)
Source. Author's calculations and Thomson Datastream























































































Difference (left) Portfolio DD (left) Average DD (left) DJ Stoxx Banks Index (right)
Source. Author's calculations and Thomson Datastream



































































Difference (left) Portfolio DD (left) Average DD (left) DJ Stoxx Banks Index (right)
Source. Author's calculations and Thomson Datastream














































































Difference Portfolio DD Average DD
ECB Median DD ECB 10th percentile DD
Source. Author's calculations and European Central Bank














































































Difference Portfolio DD Average DD
ECB Median DD ECB 10th percentile DD
Source. Author's calculations and European Central Bank






















































































Difference (left) Portfolio DD (left) Average DD (left) DJ Stoxx Banks Index (right)
Source. Author's calculations and Thomson Datastream


































































Difference (left) Portfolio DD (left) Average DD (left) DJ Stoxx Banks Index (right)
Source. Author's calculations and Thomson Datastream
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